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Abstract: China and Russia’s bilateral defense relationship has strengthened 
significantly in recent years. The steady growth in Sino-Russian military ties has 
sparked a considerable debate in the academic and policymaking communities 
over whether the Sino-Russian defense relationship has become a de-facto 
military “alliance.” However, largely absent from this discussion are assessments 
of the level of institutionalization in China and Russia’s defense relationship. This 
study utilizes Alexander Korololev’s framework for measuring alliance 
institutionalization to determine the level of institutionalization between China 
and Russia’s militaries, concluding that Beijing and Moscow’s armed forces are 
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 China and Russia’s growing defense relationship has generated significant 
consternation in the United States, which cited both Beijing and Moscow as long-term 
strategic competitors in its 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Both states pose 
serious security challenges to the United States, its allies and partners, and the U.S.-
supported liberal international order. As defense ties between China and Russia deepen, a 
debate has emerged in the academic and policy communities over whether the 
relationship has become a military alliance. A Chinese-Russian military alliance - or 
something approximating one - would pose a severe threat to global security and stability. 
Understanding the extent to which China and Russia’s defense relationship meets the 
criteria of a military alliance is critical for the security of the United States and its allies. 
The following study will specifically examine the level of institutionalization in China 
and Russia’s defense relationship.  
 
A Growing Sino-Russian Entente 
China and Russia’s bilateral relationship has strengthened considerably in recent 
years, driven by both countries’ “mutual understanding that their respective core interests 
are better served by closer cooperation.”1 Beijing and Moscow both have a vested interest 
in promoting the legitimacy of their regimes, the primacy of state sovereignty in 
 
1 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 4, Section 2, “An Uneasy Entente: 
China-Russia Relations in a New Era of Strategic Competition with the United States,” in 2019 Annual 





international affairs, and the unacceptability of Western ‘interference’ in their domestic 
affairs.2 Most importantly, China and Russia share a mutual perception that the United 
States poses an existential threat to their respective political regimes. Since 2014, the 
convergence of China and Russia’s geopolitical interests has been accelerated by the 
deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and 
increasing tensions between Washington and Beijing and over China’s increasing 
assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific as well as economic and human rights issues.3  
China and Russia have strengthened ties across nearly every aspect of their 
relationship. The bilateral relationship is now stronger than at any point since the Sino-
Soviet “unbreakable friendship” in the mid-20th century.4 At a June 2018 at a summit in 
Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced bilateral relations are at “an all-
time high,” while General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping 
described the relationship as “the highest-level…and strategically most significant 
relationship between major countries in the world.”5 In June 2019, General Secretary Xi 
and President Putin further growth in China and Russia’s bilateral ties, announcing an 
 
2 Bobo Lo, A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World. Penguin Random 
House Australia, 2017, 17. 
3 Alexander Gabuev, “Why Russia and China Are Strengthening Security Ties,” Foreign Affairs, 
September 24, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-09-24/why-russia-and-china-are-
strengthening-security-ties.  
4 Bobo Lo, “Introduction,” in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo, eds., Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st 
Century, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 2.  
5 People’s Daily, “Xi Jinping: Pushing Forward the China-Russia Relationship and Keeping Up with the 
Times,” June 9, 2018. Translation. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2018-
06/09/content_1860334.htm; Bloomberg, “Putin, Xi Hail Partnership as Trump’s North Korea Summit 
Looms,” June 7, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-08/putin-xi-to-meet-in-china-as-
trump-s-north-korea-summit-looms.  
 3 
upgrade of the Sino-Russian relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership of 
coordination in a new era.”6 
 
 
Deepening Defense Ties 
The most important component of China and Russia’s growing ties is their 
bilateral defense relationship. Beijing and Moscow have prioritized strengthening 
bilateral military-to-military ties by bolstering high-level defense contacts, conducting 
bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and increasing defense industrial 
cooperation.7 In October 2018, General Secretary Xi highlighted the growth in Sino-
Russian defense ties during a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, 
observing that, “cooperation between the two militaries has been deepened continuously 
and positive achievements have been made in areas including joint drills, real combat 
training and military competition in recent years.” General Secretary Xi further 
emphasized the importance Sino-Russian defense ties have for the broader bilateral 
relationship, stating that "both militaries can work to deal with common security threats, 
create a benign external environment for their respective state development and national 
rejuvenation, continue to improve cooperation, and provide a solid foundation for the 
development of China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination."8 In 
 
6 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press 
Conference on June 6, 2019, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1670288.shtml. 
7 Ethan Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of 
Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 20, 2017. 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-Russia%20Mil-
Mil%20Relations%20Moving%20Toward%20Higher%20Level%20of%20Cooperation.pdf. 
8 Xinhua, “Xi Meets with Russian Defense Minister,” October 19, 2018. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-10/19/c_137544996.htm.  
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March 2018, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu remarked that, “Russian- Chinese 
[military] relations today has reached principally new unprecedented level, and have 
become a critical factor in keeping peace and international security.”9 
 
Literature Review 
A Sino-Russian Military Alliance? 
The steady growth in Sino-Russian military-to-military relations has sparked 
considerable debate in the academic and policymaking communities over whether the 
Sino-Russian defense relationship has become a de-facto military “alliance”. Stephen 
Blank forcefully asserts that a Sino-Russian military alliance “is exactly what has come 
to be.”10 Graham Allison describes the relationship as a “functional military alliance,” 
while Nemetz describes Sino-Russo defense ties as an “ominous anti-American 
alliance.”11  
Others argue that long-held historical enmity between Beijing and Moscow as 
well divergence on key national interests, including economic differences and mutual 
concern over the potential military and geopolitical threat posed by the other, make Sino-
Russo military alliance unlikely. Leon Aron writes that “the history of relations between 
the two countries is fraught, and they play vastly different roles in the world economy, 
 
9 Russia’s Ministry of Defense, Russian and Chinese Defense Ministries Emphasize Importance of Russian-
Chinese Relations for International Security, March 4, 2018. 
https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12169612@egNews.  
10 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on An Emerging China-Russia Axis? 
Implications for the United States in an Era of Strategic Competition, written testimony of Stephen Blank, 
March 21, 2019, 2. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Blank_Testimony.pdf.  
11 Allison Graham, “China and Russia: A Strategic Alliance in the Making,” National Interest, December 
14, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-and-russia-strategic-alliance-making-38727.  
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making a divergence in their objectives all but unavoidable.”12 Meick similarly assesses 
that, “the development of a formal alliance is unlikely due to continued policy and 
strategic differences as well as areas of distrust.”13 In September 2018, then-U.S. 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis remarked that “I see little in the long term that aligns 
Russia and China.”14 
 
A Gap in the Discussion 
Surprisingly, alliance theory itself has been glaringly absent from this discussion. 
Recent publications on Sino-Russian defense ties have largely evaluated specific aspects 
of the relationship, failing to provide a comprehensive alliance framework through which 
to assess the overall depth of China and Russia’s military relationship and identify it on 
the alliance spectrum.  One scholar argues that, “while there have been many descriptions 
and examinations of the empirical dimensions to Russia-PRC strategic ties…few have 
focused specifically on developing an analytical framework for systematically explaining 
the specific cooperative-competitive contours of the relationship.”15 For example, a 
recent assessment of Sino-Russian defense relations authored by Ethan Meick examines 
three aspects of the relationship, high-level military contacts, military exercises, and 
military-technical cooperation, Watts, Leberd and Englebrekt examine two criteria, 
 
12 Leon Aron, “Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2019. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-04/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance.  
13 Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations," 20.  
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Media Availability with Secretary Mattis at the Pentagon, September 11, 
2018. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1628129/media-availability-with-
secretary-mattis-at-the-pentagon/.  
15 Thomas S. Wilkins, “Russo – Chinese Strategic Partnership: A New Form of Security Cooperation?” 
Contemporary Security Policy 29:2 (2008): 358.  
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military exercises and arms sales.16 As Korolev notes, in both cases “the selection of the 
specific aspects that received consideration is rather ad hoc and does not sufficiently 
demonstrate how much, and how consistently, China-Russia military cooperation has 
increased since the end of the Cold War.”17 To better understand Sino-Russian defense 
ties, it is necessary to ground evaluations of the relationship within alliance theory. 
 
Towards an Alliance Framework 
The concept of “alliances” is central to the discipline of international relations in 
both practice and theory. As Ken Booth notes, “Alliances have been pervasive features in 
both the theory of international politics and in the practice of foreign policy.”18 
Accordingly, alliance theory has received significant attention from both scholars and 
foreign policy practitioners alike. 
Definitions of military alliances vary across the body of alliance theory literature. 
Some scholars espouse narrow definitions of alliances, arguing that a necessary feature of 
an alliance is a formal treaty explicitly outlining security commitments between two or 
more states. Leeds and Anac simply define alliances as “a formal agreement among 
independent states to cooperate militarily.” 19 Morrow argues that “an alliance entails a 
formal commitment between the parties wherein certain specific obligations are written 
 
16 Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations”; John Watts, Sofia Ledberg, Kjell Engelbrekt, 
“Brothers in Arms, Yet Again? Twenty-First Century Sino-Russian Strategic Collaboration in the Realm of 
Defense and Security,” Defense Studies 16:4 (2016): 427-429.  
17 Alexander Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Cooperation,” 
Asian Security 15:3 (2018); 2.  
18 Ken Booth, “Alliances”, in John Baylis et al., eds., Contemporary Strategy I (New York: Holmes & 
Meier, 1987), 258. 
19 Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance,” 
International Interactions 31:3 (2005):185.  
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out.” 20 Snyder defines alliances as “formal associations for the use (or nonuse) of 
military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own 
membership.”21 
Other scholars define alliances more broadly. Tertrais contends that “A broader 
definition of military alliances would include those that do not imply a security 
guarantee,” and are instead defined by “the recognition of common security interests as 
well as provisions for strong military cooperation to various degrees.”22 Walt advances a 
similar but slightly more precise definition of alliance – “a formal or informal 
commitment for security cooperation between two or more states.”23 Walt asserts that the 
principal feature of any alliance, formal or informal, “is a commitment for mutual 
military support against some external actor(s) in some specific set of circumstances.” 24 
Weitzman broadly defines alliances as “bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide 
some element of security to the signatories.”25   
Typologies of military alliances also vary widely, reflecting sharp differences in 
the nature of alliance commitments and intra-alliance military cooperation. When 
forming an alliance, states make decisions regarding both the military obligations they 
are willing to incur as well as the depth and parameters of peacetime military 
cooperation.26 As Leeds and Anac note, “Leaders choose a level of formality and 
 
20 Ibid, 64.  
21 Glenn Synder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4. 
22 Bruno Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” Washington Quarterly 27:2 (Spring 2004), 
136. 
23 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39:1 (1997): 157. 
24 Ibid, 157. 
25 Patricia Weitsman, “Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and the Triple 
Entente’, Security Studies 12:3 (2003), 7.  
26 Leeds and Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance,” 185, 186.  
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peacetime military coordination when committing to an alliance.”27 Benson and Clinton 
similarly assert that “Alliances vary in the breadth of the circumstances to which the 
obligations of a military alliance have application…as well as the costliness of the 
obligations to which the signatories commit themselves when they join the alliance.”28 
Alliance theorists agree that the form and substance of military alliances vary along these 
two axes, hereafter referred to as the “scope” and “institutionalization” of an alliance. 
Scope refers to “the breadth of the circumstances to which the obligations of a military 
alliance have application,” while institutionalization refers to “the degree to which the 
alliance agreement imposes peacetime and related costs on the signatories.”29 
Alliance theory accounts for variance in the scope of military alliances. As Walt 
notes, “The form of collaboration and the nature of the commitment varies widely, 
however. An alliance may be either offensive or defensive, for example, intended either 
to provide the means for an attack on some third party or intended as a mutual guarantee 
in the event that another state attacks one of the alliance members.”30 Particularly useful 
in categorizing the obligations that determine the scope of military alliances is the 
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP). ATOP identifies five 
primary alliance obligations: “promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict - 
which ATOP further differentiates between commitments to defensive and offensive 
support, promises to remain neutral in the event of a conflict, promises to refrain from 
military conflict with one another, or promises to consult/cooperate in the event of 
 
27 Ibid, 186.  
28 Brett V. Benson and Joshua D. Clinton, “Assessing the Variation of Formal Military Alliances,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 60:5 (2016): 868. 
29 Ibid, 870.  
30 Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 157.  
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international crises that create a potential for military conflict. ATOP labels these 
obligations DEFENSE, OFFENSE, NEUTRAL, NONAGG, and CONSUL. These 
obligations are not mutually exclusive. Thus, an alliance agreement that includes a non-
aggression clause as well as a mechanism for mutual consultations in the event of war 
would be a NONAGG/CONSUL agreement.” 31 
Alliance theorists also acknowledge that military alliances vary in their level of 
institutionalization – the depth of peacetime military cooperation stipulated in and 
formalized by the alliance agreement. As Walt notes, “At one extreme, formal alliances 
such as NATO are highly institutionalized, with elaborate decision-making procedures 
and an extensive supporting bureaucracy…at the other extreme are largely ad hoc 
coalitions…limited partnerships in which each member acted relatively independently.”32  
Alliance theory holds that institutionalization imposes costs on alliance members. 
Benson and Clinton argue “alliance commitments themselves impose varying levels of 
costs on alliance members beyond those associated with the risks of conflict.”33 Thus, it 
follows that higher institutionalization incurs greater costs while lower 
institutionalization incurs lower costs. For example, “Defensive commitments that 
formalize joint military planning as well as requirements for peacetime military 
integration, the provision of aid, and military basing impose deeper costs on the alliance 
members than agreements that only contain defensive obligations.”34   
Alliance scholarship has generally maintained that greater institutionalization 
increases the effectiveness of an alliance. Leeds and Anac argue that, “greater peacetime 
 
31 The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP): http://www.atopdata.org/.  
32 Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 157.  
33 Benson and Clinton, “Assessing the Variation of Formal Military Alliances,” 873.  
34 Ibid, 868. 
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military coordination [institutionalization] should increase the value of an alliance, 
making the whole greater than the sum of its fighting effectiveness. This, in turn, should 
increase the incentives for allies to assist each other in conflict.”35 Morrow similarly 
posits that while greater institutionalization imposes greater peacetime costs on alliance 
members, it also increases allied cohesion and warfighting capability in wartime.36 
Despite the significant body of academic work on military alliances, few formal 
frameworks exist or measuring the level of an alliance’s institutionalization. However, in 
his 2018 article “On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military 
Cooperation”, Alexander Korolev proposes an empirical framework for measuring 
alliance institutionalization (See Table 1). He identifies eight characteristics of alliances 
that are divided into two groups, “moderate institutionalization” and “deep 
institutionalization.” He writes that,  
 
“both clusters address institutional arrangements and reflect the operational mechanics 
and the degree of institutionalization of an inter-military relation. The first cluster 
represents a moderate institutionalization of inter-military contacts, whereas cluster two 
represents deep institutionalization, which is a more advanced stage of alliance 
development and implies higher demands in terms of the interoperability of military 
forces and defense policy compatibility. It is reasonable to assume that a functioning 
alliance reaches a moderate degree of institutionalization before it moves into deep 
institutionalization, for which powerful incentives and political will are necessary.”37 
 
35 Leeds and Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance,” 186.  
36 James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38:2 
(1994): 270–297. 




Table 1: Korolev’s Stages and Criteria of Alliance Institutionalization 
Moderate Institutionalization 1) Alliance treaty or agreement; 2) Mechanism of 
regular consultations; 3) military-technical cooperation; 
4) regular military drills; 5) confidence building 
measures 
Deep Institutionalization 6) Integrated military command; 7) Joint troop 
placements and/or military bases exchange; 8) Common 
defense policy 
Source: Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance,” 4.  
 
 Utilizing this framework, Korolev assesses that China and Russia’s military 
relationship is “on the verge of an alliance.”38 However, Korolev’s conclusion that the 
relationship is “on the verge of an alliance,” falls outside of the alliance framework that 
he himself crafted. As he notes, “one can still argue…what a true alliance means in 
contemporary international politics,”39 meaning his assertion that the relationship “is on 
the verge of an alliance,” fails to explicitly define exactly how institutionalized the 
relationship actually is. Moreover, since Korolev published his article in 2018, significant 
developments have occurred in China and Russia’s defense relationship that merit 




38 Ibid, 15. 




Hypothesis & Methods 
This study seeks to address this gap by utilizing Korolev’s framework of alliance 
institutionalization to assess the degree of institutionalization in China and Russia’s 
defense security partnership. Using Korolev’s alliance institutionalization framework, the 
following analysis collects evidence to determine whether the Sino-Russian defense 
relationships meets the criteria outlined by Korolev.   
As previously noted, Korolev divides alliance institutionalization into two 
clusters, moderate institutionalization and deep institutionalization. Korolev argues that 
moderate institutionalization is measured by five indicators. The first is an “official 
alliance treaty or other formal agreement of military coordination in the event of a crisis 
or when either party is facing an external attack or another type of threat.”40 Korolev 
caveats this criteria by stating, “since alliance treaties vary considerably in terms of the 
precision of commitments, and moreover, at times, states can act as alliance members 
without binding treaties, this criterion is not sufficient.”41 Thus, Korolev’s second criteria 
is the mechanism of inter-military consultations. Korolev notes that, “such mechanisms 
enhance mutual understanding and increases the predictability of intra-alliance 
dynamics.”42 
The third criteria is military-technical cooperation (MTC). Korolev writes that in 
its beginning stages, “military-technical exchanges can be more of a structure for the 
 
40 Ibid, 4.  
41 Ibid, 4.  
42 Ibid, 4.  
 13 
parties to purchase military equipment or technological expertise from each other. As 
MTC moves into more advanced stages, however, it becomes more intertwined and is 
increasingly characterized by long-term projects for the joint design and production of 
arms and their components.”43 He  asserts that MTC requires significant trust between 
allies, and “requires a high level of coordination between multiple institutions (research 
centers, manufacturers, and various government agencies), shared procedures, and the 
standardization of training.”44 
The fourth criteria is regular joint military exercises.  Korolev notes that regular 
military exercises help allies “achieve a certain degree of military force compatibility and 
interoperability,” and also send “important signals, admonitions, or assurances to certain 
countries or groups of countries.”45 The fifth criterion is inter-military confidence 
building measures (CBM), CBM include agreements such as border-securitization 
measures, demilitarization measures,  establishing mechanisms for deconfliction, 
information sharing agreements, and others.46 
Deep institutionalization is categorized by three criteria, “an integrated military 
command, joint troop placement or an exchange of military bases, and a common defense 
policy.” Korolev notes that these criteria “require extensive and costly investments in 
joint action and indicate a much deeper military institutionalization. They also reflect the 
highest level of joint preparation for war. Decisions to enter this level of cooperation 
require strong incentives and strong resolve on the part of policymakers.”47 
 
43 Ibid, 4.  
44 Ibid, 4. 
45 Ibid, 4.   
46 Ibid, 5.  
47 Korolev, 5. 
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The data used to measure China and Russia’s defense relationship against these 
criteria is collected from international agreements signed by China and Russia, official 
Chinese and Russian government statements, policy documents and state media reports, 
open source news reporting, think-tank reports, and academic journals.  
Data 
Moderate Institutionalization: Alliance Treaty or Agreement 
Korolev writes that “the existence of a treaty is considered important and is often 
the first mark to look for when assessing an alliance relation.”48 In 2001, China and 
Russia signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, often 
referred to as “the Big Treaty.”49 The treaty, in effect until 2021, significantly upgraded 
the bilateral relationship and laid the foundation for the subsequent growth in Sino-Russia 
ties. The treaty, which clearly establishes a non-aggression and consultation pact, can 
also be seen as containing an implicit commitment to mutual defense.  
Article 2, 8, and 9 of the treaty clearly establish it as a non-aggression and 
consultation pact. Article 2 commits the two parties to a policy of mutual non-aggression, 
stating that “contracting parties will neither resort to the use of force; or the threat of 
force nor take economic and other means to bring pressure to bear against the other.” 
Article 8 prohibits either party from joining an alliance or undertaking any actions that 
jeopardizes the security of the other; stating that “The contracting parties shall not enter 
into any alliance or be a party to any block nor shall they embark on any such action, 
 
48 Ibid, 4. 
49 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between 





including the conclusion of such treaty with a third country which compromises the 
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party.” Article 9 
establishes a joint consultation mechanism, stating in response to a security threat to 
either state that “the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations 
in order to eliminate such threats.”50 
The treaty does not include an explicit causus foederis, a mutual defense clause 
that is the defining feature of formal military alliances. Without a clear mutual defense 
clause, some scholars assert that the treaty falls short of a defense pact. Korolev argues 
that the treaty, “does not explicitly define external threats or include a clear causus 
foederis clause…and therefore fails to qualify as a defense pact.”51 Similarly, Alexander 
Lukin writes that Alexander Lukin asserts that “the treaty did not create any alliance, let 
alone a military one. It contains no commitments regarding joint defense against 
aggression.”52 
However, the treaty can be seen as including an implicit obligation for mutual 
defense. Vasily Kashin asserts that “while the treaty did not create any obligations for 
mutual defense, it clearly required both sides to consider some sort of joint action in the 
case of a threat from a third party.”53 Specifically, Article 9’s stipulation that China and 
Russia hold consultations “in order to eliminate such threats,” can be interpreted as an 
implicit obligation for the parties to assist each other in the event of a military attack or 
the outbreak of war. Korolev writes that Article 9 “can be viewed as carrying certain 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance,” 4.  
52 Ibid, 5. 
53 Vasily Kashin, “The Current State Of Russian-Chinese Defense Cooperation”, Center For Naval 
Analyses, 2018, 14. 
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features of an implicit defense pact,”54 while Franz Stefan-Gady notes that the provision 
“could be construed as an implicit commitment to mutual defense.”55 Thus, the author 
agrees with Korolev’s assertion that the treaty sits "at the borderline between a non-
aggression/consultation pact and a defense pact.”56 
Mechanism of Regular Consultations 
China and Russia have developed an institutionalized and multilevel system of 
bilateral and multilateral security consultations. (See Appendix 1). This system was born 
as the result of the 1993 signing of the “Military Cooperation Agreement” by China and 
Russia’s defense ministries.57 The agreement called for China and Russia to “carry out 
military cooperation on…military and political consultations” including, “official visits 
by ministers of defense and other military leaders” and “working meetings of defense 
ministers and other representatives parties.”58 The Military Cooperation Agreement laid 
the groundwork for the establishment of subsequent formal consultations, including the 
Annual Strategic Consultation among Chiefs of the General Staff in 1997, the Russia-
China Consultation on the National Security Issues in 2004, and the China-Russia 
Northeast Asia Security Dialogue in 2014 (See Appendix 1). Alexander Korolev 
estimates that China and Russia hold 20-30 bilateral security consultations per year, 
including multiple high-level defense contacts per year (See Table 2).59  
 
54 Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance,” 5. 
55 Franz Stefan-Gady, “Why the West Should Not Underestimate China-Russia Military Ties,” EastWest 
Institute, January 30, 2019. https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/why-west-should-not-underestimate-china-
russia-military-ties. 
56 Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance,” 5. 
57 Russian Council of Ministers, Military Cooperation Agreement. 
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fpravo.gov.ru%2Fprox
y%2Fips%2F%3Fdocbody%3D%26nd%3D102026598%26rdk%3D%26backlink%3D1&sandbox=1.  
58 Ibid.   




Table 2: China-Russia High-Level Military-to-Military Contacts, 2003-2019 
 
Note: These contacts do not include presidential summits, meetings between border security forces, and multilateral 
summits (unless a meeting between military officials occurred on the sidelines). High-level contacts are defined as 
“officials and officers holding a leadership position and corresponding rank in the military services at or above deputy 
commander of a particular service and assistant to the chief of the general staff department (“joint staff department” in 

























Source: Data from 2003-2016 can be found in Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations,” and Kenneth 
Allen, Philip C. Saunders, and John Chen, “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2013–2016: Trends and Implications,” 
Chinese Strategic Perspectives 11 (July 17, 2017). See footnotes for data from the years 2017, 60  2018, 61 and 2019. 62 
 
Military-Technical Cooperation  
Military-technical cooperation (MTC) is a critical and growing aspect of China 
and Russia’s military relationship. Since the early 1990s, Sino-Russo MTC “has evolved 
from a one-sided relationship largely predicated on Chinese purchases of Russian 
weapons systems into an increasingly interdependent relationship characterized by long-
term joint production of military equipment and the transfer of more advanced weapons 
systems.”63 Like other components of Sino-Russian defense relations, MTC has deepened 
significantly in recent years, prompting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to 
 
60 Russian Ministry of Defense, Delegation From China Visits Russian Defense Ministry to Get 
Familiarized with Working Process of the Public Reception of the Minister of Defense, December 11, 2017; 
Russian Ministry of Defense, Implementation of Russia-China Plans to Put Bilateral Cooperation of Two 
Countries on Higher Level, October 24, 2017; Russian Ministry of Defense, Joint Sea-2017 Leadership 
Visited ‘Voroshilov Battery’, September 19, 2017; Russian Ministry of Defense, Russian Minister of 
Defense: Development of Strategic Partnership with China is An Absolute Priority, August 12, 2017; 
Russian Ministry of Defense, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation at a Meeting with His Chinese 
Counterpart in Astana Proposed to Sign a Roadmap of Cooperation in the Military Field Between Two 
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comment in 2014 that “we can now talk about the emerging technological alliance 
between the two countries.”64 
 Bilateral MTC began in 1992 when China and Russia signed the Military-
Technical Cooperation Agreement. The agreement established a legal framework for 
MTC between the two countries and led to the formation of the Mixed Intergovernmental 
Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation (MICMTC), China and Russia’s formal 
annual platform for coordinating bilateral MTC.65 Through the mid-2000s, Sino-Russian 
MTC was characterized by large Russian arms sales to China. From 1992-2006, China 
imported roughly $26 billion in Russian weaponry, accounting for nearly 80 percent of its 
arms imports.66 Chinese purchases included export variants of Russia’s Kilo-class diesel-
electric submarines, S-300 missile defense systems, and Su-27 and Su-30 multirole 
fighters.67  
During this period, Russian arms transfers to China during this period served both 
countries’ strategic interests. As the author described in a previous article,  
 
“The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had ravaged the Russian economy, 
leaving Russian defense firms desperately in need of foreign export markets to 
remain viable. Meanwhile, Beijing’s ambitious drive to modernize the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), deemed necessary by Chinese Communist Party for 
regime survival, had been severely curtailed by Western arms embargos levied on 
China in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Thus, Russian arms 
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transfers to China served both countries vital national interests, granting the PLA 
access to the military technology it needed to modernize while providing Russia’s 
defense firms the revenue they required to stay viable.”68 
 
Table 3: Russian Arms Exports to China, 1992-2019 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.” October 2020.  
Note: Trend Indicator Values are “based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is 
intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.” (SIPRI 
Arms Transfer Database) 
 
However, the mid-to-late 2000’s saw a decline in Sino-Russian MTC. The annual 
meeting of the MICMTC was cancelled in 2006-2007. Furthermore, from 2006-2010, 
there were no significant arms transfers between Beijing and Moscow. The slowdown in 
 







































































































































MTC had multiple causes. Beijing had become unhappy with the quality of the weaponry 
it imported from Russia as well as Russian contract negotiation policies.69 More 
importantly, “China’s defense industrial base had matured to the point that it could satisfy 
many of the PLA’s requirements domestically. With its basic military requirements met 
at home, China increasingly looked to Russia to purchase more advanced weapons 
systems and their underlying technology to further the PLA’s modernization.”70 
However, Russia refused to sell its most advanced military equipment to China due to 
fears regarding Beijing’s growing military strength vis-à-vis Moscow and concerns 
regarding Beijing’s intellectual property theft of Russian military technology and 
unlicensed reverse-engineering of Russian weapons systems.71  
Starting in 2008, Sino-Russian MTC began to improve. Regular meetings of the 
joint commission were reinstated, and on December 11th China and Russia signed the 
Agreement of Intellectual Property in Military Technical Cooperation.72 It was not until 
2014, however, that Sino-Russian MTC began to significantly ramp up. Russia, isolated 
from the international community following its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
undertook a major strategic orientation away from the West and towards Beijing. As a 
result, the nature of Sino-Russian MTC changed considerably, becoming a more 
reciprocal and interdependent relationship as Moscow became increasingly dependent on 
Beijing.  
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In subsequent years, Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation rapidly 
deepened. Russia resumed arms sales to China, including the sale of advanced equipment 
that Russia was previously unwilling to transfer to Beijing. From 2014-2018, Russia 
accounted for 70 percent of China’s arms imports. Furthermore, Moscow and Beijing 
began undertaking long-term joint production of weapons systems. Notable arms sales 
and joint-weapons development projects include: 
Arms Sales:  
• S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense system: In 2015 Russia 
announced the sale of two regiments of its most advanced air defense 
system, the S-400, to China for an estimated $3 billion. 73 The sale is 
notable because Russia was previously hesitant to sell the S-400 to 
Beijing.74 Russia completed delivery of the first regimental set in May 
2018, and began delivery of the second set in July 2019.75 The sale 
reportedly includes a training course provided by Russia to Chinese 
operators of the S-400.76 
• Su-35 multi-role air-superiority fighter: In November 2015, China signed 
a $2.5 billion contract for 24 Su-35 planes.77 The Su-35 is an “upgraded, 
twin-engine, multirole air superiority fighter aircraft.”78 Russia was 
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previously hesitant to sell China the Su-35 due to concerns China would 
reverse engineer the Su-35’s powerful AL-41FS engine.79 Russia 
completely the delivery of the Su-35 to China in April 2019. The sale also 
included the “delivery of ground support equipment and reserve aircraft 
engines.80 
Joint Weapons Development Projects:  
• Missile-Attack Early-Warning System: In October 2019, President Putin 
announced that Russia’s defense industry is helping the PLA build a 
modern missile-attack early-warning system. At least one $60 million 
contrast has reportedly been signed for a Russian defense firm to develop 
software for a future PLA early-warning missile defense network.81 
• Next Generation Heavy Lift Helicopter: In June 2015 China and Russia 
signed an, “intergovernmental agreement on the joint development of a 
heavy helicopter.”82 The agreement stipulated that Chinese company 
Avicopter would partner with Russian Helicopters to develop the 
helicopter. Avicopter was reportedly responsible for “the process 
organization, as well as design, testing, certification, and series production 
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of the rotorcraft,” while Russian Helicopters’ contributed “several 
subsystems and technology transfer” to the project.83 
• Lada-class Submarine: In December 2012, China and Russia “signed a 
framework agreement for joint construction of four Lada-class (Project 
677E) diesel-electric attack submarines (the Russian export version is 
known as Amur-1650).”84 In October 2014, the first Lada-class was 
reportedly delivered to China.85 
• GAZ “Tigr” infantry mobility vehicle: In 2011, The Russian Military 
Industrial Company began to assemble its GAZ “Tigr” all terrain, 
multipurpose infantry mobility vehicles in China.86 
China has also become a critical source of some military and dual-use 
technologies for Moscow after the imposition of Western sanctions and arms embargoes 
on Russia post-Crimea. China can offer Russia electronic components, composite 
materials, UAV technology, and engines for warships that Moscow can’t procure from 
the West.87 As a result, the bilateral MTC relationship has become much more reciprocal 
than it was previously.88 
This growth in Sino-Russian MTC reflects the overall strengthening of the 
bilateral military-to-military relationship. MTC has progressed to a point where Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, “We can now even talk about the emerging 
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technological alliance between the two countries.”89 The sale and joint development of 
advanced weapons systems requires significant trust between the collaborating parties. 
Korolev notes that, “the proper organization of MTC requires a high level of coordination 
between multiple institutions (research centers, manufacturers, and various government 
agencies), shared procedures, and the standardization of training.”90  
 
Regular Military Drills  
Joint military exercises are arguably the most important aspect of China and 
Russia’s military relationship (for a full list of Sino-Russian joint military exercises, see 
Appendix 2). In 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s 2015 remarked that, 
“The most important issue of the Russian-Chinese military cooperation are the joint 
military exercises.”91 Joint military exercises contribute to China’s and Russia’s security 
partnership in three critical ways. First, they help Beijing and Moscow’s armed forces 
(particularly the PLA) improve their tactical and operational capabilities as well as 
increasing their interoperability, enhancing their ability to conduct joint operations.92 
Second, the exercises serve a mutual reassurance function, affirming China and Russia’s 
“commitment to military cooperation as an important dimension of their evolving 
relationship.”93 Third, joint military exercises signal to third parties, particularly the 
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United States, China and Russia’s strong commitment to supporting each other’s security 
interests to international audiences.94 
Currently, Moscow and Beijing maintain two principal recurring joint exercise 
programs, the Peace Mission counter-terrorism exercises, and the Joint Sea naval 
exercises. China and Russia have also participated in a number of exercises outside of the 
Peace Mission and Joint Sea frameworks, including Russia’s annual large-scale strategic 
military exercises. Since the first Sino-Russian joint military exercises was held in 2003, 
the frequency, complexity, and geographic scope of subsequent exercises has 
dramatically increased. 
Peace Mission: Since 2005, China and Russia have participated in a recurring 
joint military exercise known as “Peace Mission.” Held under the auspices of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Peace Mission is an anti-terrorism 
exercise designed to strengthen the ability of SCO members to combat “terrorism, 
extremism, and separatism.”95 The exercise typically consists of three phases, 
joint consultations and operational planning, troop transportation and deployment, 
and combat operations.96 As “Peace Mission” has matured, the exercises have 
become increasingly complex, featuring more challenging operations, greater 
interoperability, and more advanced weapons systems.”97 Though the Peace 
Mission exercises are nominally anti-terrorism operations, many analysts contend 
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that the exercises resemble conventional military operations. During Peace 
Mission 2016, for example, participants conducted a wide range of joint air-
ground exercises involving a wide array of advanced weapons including air-to-
ground precision strikes.98 
Joint Sea: Since 2012, China and Russia have conducted Joint Sea, an annual 
bilateral naval exercise. Joint Sea provides a forum for the Chinese and Russian 
navies to gain operational experience by engaging in a wide range of joint 
activities. Since its inception, Joint Sea has increased in both complexity and 
geographic scope. For example, Joint Sea 2016 included a complex air-sea 
amphibious exercise conducted by Chinese and Russian naval forces.99 During 
Joint Sea 2019, held from April 29 to May 4, the Chinese and Russian navies 
conducted a join sea-based live-fire air defense exercise for the first time in 
addition to holding various live-fire exercises, search and rescue operations, 
communications exercises, and anti-submarine warfare exercises.100 Further, Joint 
Sea exercises have expanded into sensitive waters that hold strategic value for 
either Moscow or Beijing, included the Mediterranean Sea (2015), the South 
China Sea (2016), and the Baltic Sea (2017).101 However, there are limits to the 
effectiveness of the Joint Sea program. The exercises place little emphasis on 
interoperability, restricting the ability of the Chinese and Russian navies to 
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practice conducting joint operations against a real-world adversary. In addition, 
Joint Sea exercises are limited in terms of scope and duration compared to typical 
U.S. and allied naval exercises, limited the operational benefits of the Joint Sea 
program for the Chinese and Russian militaries.102 
Annual Russian Strategic Exercises: The most recent notable development 
regarding Sino-Russo military exercises is the participation of PLA forces in 
Russia’s annual large strategic military exercises. In 2018 Moscow’s 2018 
invitation to Beijing to participate for the first time in one of Russia’s major 
annual strategic military exercises, Vostok-2018.103 Russia holds an annual major 
strategic exercise that rotates through its four military districts, Vostok (East), 
Zapad (West), Tsentr (Center), and Kavkaz (South).104 China sent 3,200 troops, 
900 tanks and armored vehicles, and 30 fixed-wing aircraft from the PLA’s 
Northern Theatre Command to participate in the 2018 iteration of the exercise, 
Vostok-2018, which took place from September 11-17 in Eastern Russia. The 
exercise simulated a large-scale conventional military campaign to repel an 
enemy invasion of Russian territory.105 Chinese forces also participated in the 
2019 (Tsentr) and 2020 (Kavkaz) iterations of the exercise.  
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Aerospace Security Exercises: In 2016, China and Russia expanded added missile 
defense to their portfolio of bilateral military exercises, holding Aerospace 
Security 2016—the first computer-simulated missile defense exercise between 
China and Russia—to signal opposition to U.S.-South Korean discussions about 
deploying a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South 
Korea.106 The five day exercise aimed to improve interoperability between 
Russian and Chinese missile and air defense groups and involved “defending 
territory against accidental and provocative ballistic and missile strikes.”107 China 
and Russia conducted a follow-on exercise, Aerospace Security 2017, in 
December 2017.108 The decision to launch the Aerospace Security program 
reflects a growing level of convergence between China and Russia on countering 
U.S. missile defense.  
 
Confidence Building Measures 
Confidence building measures between China and Russia have focused on 
resolving their historical border disputes and reducing security concerns. In the late 
1980s, China and the then-Soviet Union began negotiations to resolve their long-standing 
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border disputes.109 In 1991, the two states signed an agreement demarcating the eastern 
portion of the border, followed by a supplementary agreement in 2004.110 A 1994 
agreement signed by China and the Russian Federation demarcated the western portion of 
the border.111 In 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Russian Foreign 
Minister. Sergei Lavrov signed the “additional protocol on the eastern part of borders,” 
formally ending their decades long border disputes.  
 Success in the border negotiations fostered good will between China and Russia 
that allowed the two states to establish confidence building measures relating to military 
and security affairs (see Appendix 3) Korolev writes that “it was the multiple border 
negotiations from which the subsequent trust-building measures…gradually 
developed.”112 For example, the signing of the 1994 border agreement was 
complemented by the signing of the “Agreement on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Against Each Other and Not Targeting Strategic Nuclear Weapons at Each Other.”113 In 
2009, the two countries signed an “Agreement on Mutual Notification of the Launch of 
Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles.”114 
These confidence building measures do not suggest that China and Russia have 
completely eliminated their historical mistrust of each other. However, they do 
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demonstrate a willingness on the part of Beijing and Moscow to reduce bilateral tensions 
in order to strengthen their strategic partnership.115 
 
Deep Institutionalization: Integrated Military Command 
 
China and Russia have made significant strides in their ability to integrate their 
military forces and conduct joint operations. Although open source information is 
limited, reporting on China and Russia’s recent military interactions demonstrates the 
growing interoperability of their military forces and an increasingly integrated military 
command capability. A number of recent Sino-Russian military interactions highlight the 
growing ability of China and Russia’s militaries to operate jointly.  
• Kavkaz-2020: During Russia’s annual large scale strategic military 
exercise, “Kavkaz-2020”, Russian troops trained Chinese forces to use 
Russian “command and communication” equipment, demonstrating an 
increased capacity for integrated military command.116 
• Tsentr-2019: During 2019 iteration of Russia’s annual strategic exercise, 
dubbed  “Tsenter-2019,”, “dropped live ordinance together with Russian 
jets.”117 
• 2019 Joint Bomber Patrol: On July 23, 2019, the People’s Liberation 
Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the Russian Air Force conducted their first 
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joint strategic bomber patrol, highlighting the increasing interoperability 
of China and Russia’s military forces. Two PLAAF Xian H-6K bombers 
were joined by two Russian Tupolev Tu-95MS bombers on the long-range 
aerial patrol, reportedly violating South Korean’s air defense identification 
zone (KADIZ) in the process. Notably, South Korea’s Ministry of Defense 
stated that the Chinese and Russian aircraft “engaged in coordinated 
maneuvering” while flying in the KADIZ.118 Wu Qian, spokesman for 
China’s Ministry of Defense, stated that the patrol was aimed at 
“upgrading joint operation capacity” while Russia’s Ministry of Defense 
indicated that the patrol was intended to “strengthen global strategic 
stability”.119  
• Joint Sea 2019: China and Russia conducted a joint sea-based live-fire air 
defense exercise for the first time as part of the bilateral Joint Sea- 2019 
military exercise. A spokesman for China’s Ministry of Defense noted that 
the exercise was intended to improve “joint maritime defensive 
operations” between China and Russia. The exercise, which required close 
coordination between Chinese and Russian ships and command organs, 
demonstrates both the increasing interoperability of China and Russia’s 
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military forces as well as their growing ability to integrate their command 
structures.120 
• Vostok 2018: During Vostok 2018, China and Russia’s air forces operated 
in a unified formation for the first time, marking significant progress in 
their ability to operate jointly.121  
• Joint Sea 2016: During Joint Sea 2016, Chinese and Russian naval forces 
utilized a “joint command information system” for the first time.122 
• Joint Sea 2015: During Joint Sea 2015, Beijing and Moscow established a 
joint command center for their warships participating in the exercise.123 
 
Joint Troop Placements/Military Base Exchanges 
Currently, there is no publicly available evidence that China and Russia have 
exchanged military bases or jointly deployed military forces. 
 
Common Defense Policy 
While it is hard to confirm via open sources the extent to which China and Russia 
share a common defense policy, recent Sino-Russian military activities in the Asia-
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Pacific suggest that China and Russia are closely aligning their defense policies. Most 
notable was the joint Sino-Russian long-range air patrol in July 2019. Dmitri Trenin 
noted it is likely that “such patrols will become a regular feature.”124 The month prior, 
two Russian bombers made an unprecedented flight circling the island of Taiwan. Given 
China’s sensitivity to foreign militaries operating in the Taiwan Strait, U.S. Admiral 
Philip Davidson, then Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip 
Davidson, remarked that “the fact that the Chinese did not challenge those flights 
suggests that they had the tacit approval of Beijing.”125 Additionally, in June 2016, a 
PLAN frigate rendezvoused with three Russian naval vessels in the waters surrounding 
the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited island chain in the East China Sea claimed by China, 
Japan, and Taiwan. Ownership of the islands, which are administered by Japan, is the 
source of a long-standing dispute between China and Japan.126 While these episodes do 
not indicate the emergence of unified Sino-Russian defense policies, they demonstrate 
that Beijing and Moscow are coordinating their military activities in strategically 
significant regions. Furthermore, Korolev notes that these military interactions show “a 
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Analysis 
The data demonstrates that China and Russia’s defense relationship meets all five 
criteria of moderate alliance institutionalization. The 2001 “Big Treaty” signed by the 
two countries qualifies clearly as a non-aggression/consultation pact, and can be 
interpreted as containing an implicit commitment to mutual defense. Beijing and Moscow 
have established multiple high-level defense consultations on bi-lateral security interests, 
regional security, and counterterrorism. Bilateral military-technical cooperation is 
characterized by the Russian sale of increasingly advanced weapons systems to China as 
well as the joint production of sophisticated weapons systems and defense technology. 
The two militaries have established regular military exercises that continue to expand in 
their complexity, geographic scope, and level of interoperability demonstrated. They 
have also signed a number of confidence building agreements designed mostly to de-
escalate mutual security concerns and diffuse long-standing border disagreements.  
In analyzing the level of institutionalization in China and Russia’s defense 
relationship, it is useful to compare Sino-Russian defense ties to formal U.S. alliances 
such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. The NATO alliance is 
widely regarded as the prime example of a deeply institutionalized alliance,128 providing 
a useful benchmark for evaluating how closely the level of institutionalization in China 
and Russia’s defense partnership resembles a “true” military alliance.   
In assessing the criteria of “moderate alliance institutionalization”, two. Aspects 
of China and Russia’s defense relationship, “mechanisms of regular consultations” and 
“military-technical cooperation”, are particularly robust. China and Russia have 
 
128 Walt, 157.  
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established an extensive system of regular defense consultations. This system extends 
top-down throughout Beijing and Moscow’s respective defense establishments, from “top 
decision makers (today, Putin and Xi) and their administrative apparatuses to defense 
ministries and their subdivisions to regional military districts and border garrisons to 
military educational institutions.”129 These consultations build mutual understanding 
between Chinese and Russian defense officials and military officers, facilitate arms 
packages, prepare bilateral and joint exercises, and provide venues to discuss bilateral 
military cooperation as well as critical regional and global security concerns.130 The 
number and breadth of these consultations have continued to grow in response to changes 
in China and Russia’s security environments. For example, the Northeast Asia Security 
Dialogue, formed in response to the “growing number of negative trends in the 
development of the regional situation,”131 has increased the frequency  of meetings in 
response to regional events such as the United States 2017 decision to deploy the 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system to South Korea.132  Looking 
forward, China’s 2019 defense white paper affirmed the critical role bilateral 
consultations will continue to play in the bilateral defense relationship, calling for the 
“sound development of exchange mechanisms at all levels” and “expanded cooperation 
in high-level exchanges” between China and Russia’s militaries.133 
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Military-technical cooperation between China and Russia is deeply 
institutionalized. Bilateral institutions such as the MICTIC have facilitated Russia’s post-
Crimea resumption of large-scale transfers of military to China, including advanced 
weapons systems Moscow was previously hesitant to sell Beijing. In addition, China and 
Russia have used these institutions to catalyze the joint production of major weapons 
systems while seeking to “jointly develop dual-use technologies including next-
generation telecommunications, robotics and artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and. 
Internet and data governance.”134 
The recent growth in bilateral MTC reflects China and Russia’s  “complementary 
needs and capabilities that they can leverage to advance their great-power pursuits.”135  
As a result of their respective geopolitical disputes with the West, both Beijing and 
Moscow have limited access to advanced Western defense technologies, increasing the 
importance of bilateral military-technical cooperation for the modernization of the 
Russian Armed Forces and the People’s Liberation Army.136 China and Russia’s 
respective defense industrial bases also have complementary strengths that they can 
leverage to strengthen their respective militaries. As the author previously noted in a 
Defense360 article, “Beijing has become a critical source of key military and dual-use 
technologies for Russia as a result of sanctions that prevent it from purchasing similar 
technologies from the West. Russia is now dependent on China to provide critical items 
including electronic components for its aerospace programs, composite materials, UAV 
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technology, and marine diesel engines for the Russian Navy.”137 In October 2019, 
Premier of China’s State Council Li Keqiang articulated this trend, stating the necessity 
for China and Russia to “deepen cooperation in scientific and technological innovation, 
give full play to complementary advantages, and fully tap the potential of cooperation 
between the two countries in basic research, applied research, and industrialization of 
scientific and technological achievements”138 
Thus, the scope of China and Russia’s mechanisms of regular consultations and 
the depth of their bilateral MTC approaches and in some cases likely surpasses the level 
of MTC among NATO partners. However, two different criteria of moderate 
institutionalization, alliance treaty or agreement, regular military drills, and confidence 
building measures, reveals that the Sino-Russian defense partnership falls short of the 
level of institutionalization demonstrated by NATO countries.   
The author’s analysis of the 2001 “Big Treaty” concluded that it contained an 
implicit obligation for mutual defense. This implicit obligation falls well short of the 
explicit commitment for mutual defense outlined in NATO’s founding treaty. Article IV 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949, stipulates that  
“an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall 
be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such 
an armed attack occurs, each of them… will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, 
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such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”139 
 
Sino-Russian joint military exercises also fail to measure up to their U.S. 
equivalents. Evaluating the efficacy of the “Peace Mission” exercise series, Paul 
Schwartz writes that “the level of interoperability, though improved, still remained 
relatively limited, especially in comparison with comparable exercise held within 
Western alliances.”140 Assessing the Sino-Russian maritime exercises, he notes that the 
Joint Sea naval exercises are “significantly shorter than the typical U.S./allied naval 
exercise,” and “also tend to be smaller than their U.S./allied counterparts.”141 
Where China and Russia’s defense partnership least resembles U.S. formal 
alliances are in the criteria for “deep alliance institutionalization.” While recent Sino-
Russian military activities and joint military exercises have demonstrated a nascent 
capability for the PLA and Russian Defense Forces to integrate their military forces, 
NATO’s military forces feature a fully integrated command structure.142 Furthermore, 
while there is no evidence of China and Russia engaging in joint troop placement or 
exchanging military bases, NATO forces “maintain 6,800 posts across seven commands”  
stretched across NATO territory.143 Lastly, while China and Russia have signaled their 
support for each other’s key security interests,  the relationship lacks NATO’s formal 
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institutions for crafting common defense policies.  The North Atlantic Council, “the 
principal political decision-making body and oversees the political and military process 
relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance,”144 determines NATO defense 
policy through “consensus decision-making” in which “consultations take place until a 
decision that is acceptable to all is reached.” 145 This means that when NATO policy is 
announced “it is therefore the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states 
that are members of the Alliance.”146 
Thus, the evidence makes clear that while China and Russia’s defense relationship 
meets all the criteria of moderate alliance institutionalization to various extents, it has 
only recently reached the nascent stages of “deep institutionalization.” Thus, it is accurate 
to say that, rather than being “on the verge of an alliance,” as Korolev writes, the Sino-
Russian defense relationship is “on the verge of deep institutionalization.”   
 
Conclusion 
 China and Russia’s mutual security concerns and the convergence of their 
geostrategic interests make it highly likely that their bilateral defense relationship will 
continue to deepen in the near future. It may one day even become a “formal” military 
alliance.147 However, it is clear that for the time being, rather than resembling a deeply 
institutionalized, NATO-style alliance, the relationship stands “on the verge of deep 
institutionalization.” 
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It is likely that experts will continue to debate what constitutes a military alliance 
and whether China and Russia’s military-to-military relationship constitutes a true 
alliance. For example, some may note that the level of institutionalization in China and 
Russia’s defense relationship remains a far cry from the level of institutionalization 
between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),148 while others 
will highlight that the relationship is more institutionalized than other alliances such as 
the U.S.-Thailand alliance.149 However, it is undeniable that Beijing and Moscow have 
established a deep, multifaceted defense relationship, that will likely continue to develop 
in the near future. 
China and Russia’s defense relationship will most likely continue to grow in the 
near future. It will be important for future studies to continue to monitor the growth in the 
bilateral relationship using Korolev’s criteria. However, points of friction exist in the 
relationship that may undermine continued defense cooperation. For example, tensions 
might arise between Beijing and Moscow over Beijing’s growing influence in Central 
Asia, or China’s desire to become an “Arctic Power.” Most importantly, the “Big Treaty” 
expires in 2021. The nature of the Sino-Russian defense relationship for the next two 
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Appendix 1: Key China-Russia Military Consultations 
 
Name Institutional Level  Purpose 
1992 - China-Russia 
Intergovernmental Joint 
Commission on Military 
Technology Cooperation 
“Usually co-chaired by China’s vice 
chairman of the CCP’s Central 
Military Commission (CMC) and 
Russia’s defense minister. Regular 
participants also include Russian 
deputy defense ministers, China’s 
defense minister, and other key 
officials and personnel; held annually 
except for 2006-2007.”150 
Discuss arms sales and broader 
defense industrial cooperation.  
1993 – Regular Meetings 
Between the Defense 
Ministers of Russia and 
China 
Defense Ministers; held annually.   Discuss general strategic issues 
and military strategy.  
1997- Annual Strategic 
Consultation among 
Chiefs of the General 
Staff151 
Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs of the 
Russian Armed Forces General Staff 
Department and the PLA Joint Staff 
Department; held annually.   
Discuss practical issues of 
military cooperation including 
military technical cooperation 
and joint military exercises; 
practical implementation of 
military agreements reached at 
higher levels.  
2001 – Consultations held 
through the SCO: 1) 
SCO’s Annual Summits; 
2) Meetings of the SCO’s 
Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure; 3) SCO 
Defense Ministers 
Meeting152 
Heads of State of SCO member 
countries, Defense Ministers, various 
military officials and experts; each 
consultation held yearly.   
Discuss issues of regional 
security and stability in Central 
Asia; conduct intelligence 
sharing; plan joint military 
exercises.  
2004 – China-Russia 
Consultation on National 
Security Issues153 
Heads of Russia’s Security Council 
and the heads of China’s State 
Council; held annually from 2004-
2009, since 2009 held four times a 
year.  
Discuss China and Russia’s 
immediate national interests.  
2014 – China-Russia 
Northeast Asia Security 
Dialogue154 
Deputy Foreign Ministers and 
diplomats and military experts of 
different ranks; held every two or 
three months.  
Facilitate effectives security 
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Appendix 3: Key Chinese-Russian Confidence Building Measures (CBM) 
 
CBM Purpose  
May 1991 Agreement on the 
Eastern Sector of the National 
Boundaries 
Demarcated the eastern portion of the Sino-
Russian border209 
December 1992 Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Guiding 
Principle for Mutual Reductions 
of Armed Forces and the 
Strengthening of Trust in the 
Border Region 
Designed to foster a “common border of 
trust” between China and Russia. The two 
sides “re-affirmed that they would reduce the 
armed forces along the border to the lowest 
level commensurate with friendly 
relations.”210 
Military Cooperation Agreement   
July 1994 Agreement on the 
Prevention of Dangerous 
Military Activities 
The agreement called for “safeguards against 
an accidental missile launch, bans on the use 
of eye-damaging lasers, the ending of 
electronic jamming of communications, and 
the establishment of an early-warning system 
against inadvertent intrusion of the other’s 
borders by aircraft and ships”211 
September 1994 Western Border 
Agreement 
Demarcated the western portion of the Sino-
Russian border212 
September 1994 Agreement on 
No First Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Against Each Other and Not 
Targeting Strategic Nuclear 
Weapons at Each Other 
China and Russia pledged to renounce the 
first use of nuclear weapons against the other 
and to target their strategic nuclear weapons 
away from each other. After the signing of 
this CBM bilateral relations were upgraded 
from “good neighborliness” to “constructive 
cooperation”213 
August 1995 Agreement on 
Cooperation in Border Defense 
Signed by “China’s Ministry of National 
Defense and the Russian Federal Border 
Guard Administration”214 
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April 1996 Shanghai Agreement The agreement “provided for the pledge of 
nonaggression, nonuse of force, notifications 
preceding military exercises and other 
military maneuvers, and limits on the number 
and types of exercises permitted within the 
100- kilometer” CBM zone215 
May 1997 Moscow Agreement The agreement focused on “the reduction of 
regular troops, though not border guards or 
strategic forces, within a 100- kilometer zone 
on either side of the former Sino-Soviet 
boundary”216 
1998 China-Russia Protocol on 
Border Defense Information 
Exchange  
 
Agreement establishing new information 
sharing on border defense217 
2004 Agreement on the Eastern 
Segment of the China-Russia  
Border  
 
Resolved questions regarding the eastern 
portion of the Sino-Russian border leftover 
from the 1991 agreement.218 
2008 Additional Protocol on the 
Eastern Part of Borders 
Finalized the complete demarcation of the 
Sino-Russian border219 
2009 Agreement on Mutual 
Notification about Launches of 
Ballistic Missiles and Space 
Launch Vehicles 
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